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Druft Recommendaion
on the situdion in Kosovo
The Assembly,
(il Noting thatthe European forces eqgaged in the Allied Force and Joint Guardian operations have
derronstrated their ability to interve,ne effectively in a crisis, in spite of their shortcomings in terms of
comrumd stnrcnres and sophisticated equipment;
(ii) Noting that European governme,nts have demonstrated their capacity tD ac/.. together and over-
come their differences of political and military evaluation in order to assert their common interests, and
have also been able to maintain their decision-making autonomy in the face of requests from more pow-
erfirl allies;
(iii) Desirous that ttre lessons learned from the Kosovo war serve to strengthen European coopera-
tion in the defence fie14 in particular with regard to equipment intelligence capabilities and tansport
4SSetS;
(iv) Desirous also that WEU nations coordinate more closely the deployment of their forces in the
Balkans in orderto alleviate the problems of manpower shortages some ofthem are experie,ncing;
(u) Expressing the wish tbat when componext units of KFOR are next reliwd forces answerable
to WEU (FAWEU), such as ttre European Corps, be engaged on the ground;
@ Noting that a sitration of insecurity persists in Kosovo and at fu borders, in spite of the pres-
ence of KFOR and the activities of the international police force;
(viil Wonied aboutthe ongoing inter<thnic violence and the growing role being played by the former
KLA in the political and adrrinistrative management of Kosovo, to the detriment of moderate Albanian
political forces and the represe,ntatives of other Kosovar cornrnunities;
(viiil Concerned about the consequences for regional stability of any change in the status of Kosovo
which would not be consistent with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 wbtch
stipulates that:
"The Security Council,
(...) l. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general prin-
ciples in Annex l:
(...) Annex I
(. 
. . ) - A political process towards the establishme,nt of an inrcrim political framework agreement
providing for a substantial self-governme,rt for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the other counties of the regroq and the demilitarisation ofthe KLA;
- 
Comprehe,lrsive approach to the economic developme,nt and stabilisation of the crisis re-
gon (. .).
Annex 2
Agreeme,lrt should be reached on the folowing principles to move towards a resolution of the
Kosovo crisis :
(...) 5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of tlre international civil
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy subsuntial autonomy within the Federal
Republic ofYugoslavi4 to be decided bythe Security Cormcil of the United Nations. The interim
administration is to provide tansitional administration while establishing and overseeing the de-
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velopmex$ of provisional democratic self-governing instiartions to e,nsure conditions for a peace-
ful and norrral life for aU inhabitants in Kosovo (...)":
(ix) Concerned aboutthe delays affecting the deployment of the international police force and about
the te,nsions which may be ge,nerated in those parts of Kosovo with a Serb majority by the deployment
of local police forces, composed almost entirely of Kosovar Albanians;
(x) Noung with concern the continuing instability in Albania and the increasingly radical positions
being adopted by some represe,ffatives of the Albanian community in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM);
(xi) Hoping that European governmexfs are planning to maintain or expand the security presence in
those two countries, with the agreemerft of their govemments;
(rii) Regretting that the WEU Council has not so far envisaged making a contibution to stabilising
Kosovo by providing assistance for police forces or dernining.operations,
RECOMMENDS THAT TI{E COI.JNCIL
l. Put the issue of Kosovo on its agenda and ask the governments of WEU nations to participate
actively in the KFOR and intemational police force missions with a view to sharing out the joint effort
in an equitable fashion;
2. Ask the WEU Military Staff to submit options for the possible deployment in Kosovo of
FAWEU, in particular the European Corps, to relieve the KFOR units cr:rre, rfly serving in the province;
3. Envisage cooperating with the United Nations and OSCE on the international police force and
border monitoring, in order to give those organisations the be,nefit of the expertise WEU acquired in this
field as a result of the UN errbargo-monitoring operation on the Danube and the Multinational Advisory
Police Elemexil (MAPE) inAlbania;
4. Propose to the European Union that it give WEU a mandate in Kosovo for demining operations in
cooperation with KFO& for which it would draw on the expertise it acquired in Croatia;
5. Closely involve WEU's south-eastern European states and Turkey in the discussions on Kosovo;
6. Encourage, ttrough the Westem European Armamerfs Group (WEAG) and Western European
Armamerfs Organisation (WEAO), the creation ofjoint progrcrnmes and broad cooperation in the field
of elestronic warfare and battlefield surveillance equipment;
7. Give impetus to the developme,nt of a European space-based observation and communication
system, for which the WEU Satellite Cente is the fus component.
4
DOCUMENT 1670
Explanotory Memorandum
(submilted by Mr Tmmenil, Rapporteur, anil Mr Bdrsony, co-Rapporteur)
I. Introduclion
1. On 10 June 1999, the Kosovo war ended
after 78 days of military operations at two levels:
in the air 
- 
with NATO inthe front line 
- 
and on
the ground 
- 
where KLA units were pirched
against the Yugoslav military and police forces.
In spite of the resources put into this war, it was
ended by dint not of weapons but of complex
diplomatic negotiations conducted by the Contact
Group for Former Yugoslavia, the G-8, the
European Union and the United Nations. The
result, somewhat similar to what happened fol-
lowing NATO's interve,ntion in Bomiq was to
freeze the situation on the goun{ a stable and
lastirg solution to the question of Kosovo's
status not having been found.
2. During the conflict there was criticism of
the way in which military operations were being
conducted and of the means used. Generally
speaking, the military operations were performed
with professionalism and relative efficie,ncy,
given the political constraints, which weighed
much more heavily than during the Gulf war 
- 
a
conventional territorial war fought under UN
auspices 
- 
or during the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. However, political and military
evaluations of the Kosovo war are marked by the
controversy and doubt which emerged after the
cessation of hostilities as a result of the develop-
msnts unfolding in this region during the first few
weeks and which continue today.
3. Following a first reportr in which the As-
sembly's Defence Commiuee followed NATO's
air campzign and analysed the various options
open to the Alliance for interve,ntion on the
ground, it has decided to review the situation
following the cessation of hostilities, with a view
to drawing lessons from the conflict in order to
contribute to the debate on the underlying con-
cepts of a European crisis-management and cri-
sis-intervention policy, and the means of putting
them into practice.
rS.. 
"fn" situation in Kosovo", Assembly Docu-
ment 1651, 10 June 1999.
II. Military aspeds of the situation in Kosovo
4. The arrival of the KFOR troops in Kosovo
on 12 June 1999, following the negotiated with-
drawal of the Yugoslav military and paramilitary
forces, was hailed as a sfiategic victory for the
Alliance and rmoactively sanctioned by uN
Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10
June. However, our analysis of the situation to-
day, three months afterthe end of the conflict, is
somewhat more cautious. Indeed" a comparison
of the official statemerlts on air srike targets
with the results given by military sources and the
facts established on the goun{ raises a number
of questions which have not all been satisfacto-
rily resolved.
5. The impact of the air strikes, the diplo-
mary conducted in parallel by European coun-
ties, the United States and Russi4 and the role
of the KIA are some of the factors which con-
tributed to the outcome of the war, but it is diffi-
cult to ideffiry the key elements which dster-
mined the Yugoslav Government's decision to
ternporarily hand over the contol of Kosovo to
international authorities. To quote the catch
phrase of an internationally known television
series, 'lhe fruth is out there", as far as the reali-
ties ofthis conflict are concerned.
6. In addition to the political issues, the
military dimension is very important, because it
enabled the concepts of deploynent of forces,
operations planning and coordinatio4 and readi-
ness and equipment of forces, to be tested in a
real crisis situation, clearly revealing the much
decried disparity between the United States'
military capability and that of its European al-
lies. It is both important and necessary that the
European allies should leamthe lessons fromthis
war together and not simply apply the recom-
mendations stenrming from the evaluation pro-
cess in a purely national framework.
A. Assessrnent oJNATO operdions
7. According to a re,port prepared by the
Center for Srategic and lntemational Studies
(CSIS) for the US Air Force, assessing the air
campaign over the FRY, 'the initial NATO re-
porting on the effective,ness of the air and missile
campaign had little value or credibility. The data
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that NATO, the British, and the US released
became more detailed over time, although they
still had a high propaganda cont€xlt through the
end of the campaign. (...) The reporting on sor-
ties rates was approximate and often contradic-
tory. There was little reporti4g on how many
strikes actually delivered munitions, what aircraft
performed what missions, the number of weap-
ons released by qpg and their effestive,ness"2.
8. Indeed, it was only three months after the
end of hostilities that the first verified results
were published by NATO. Those results continue
to be contested by the press and by independent
analysts, who sometimes quote military, essen-
tially American, sources. This may appear to be
a debate of minor importance, but it will have
consequexrces in the future for joint operations by
the United States, the European allies and Can-
ada in the framework of the Alliance or an. ad
ftoc coalition.
1. Thenil:ituytugds
9. NATO's air ca:npaign in Kosovo had
tbree phasss3. The fust involved the bonrbing of
military targets in Kosovo and the FRY. It
stafied on.24 March 1999 with attacks against
the integrated air defence systerr all over the
FRY. During the second phase, which started on
27 March 1999, the range of targsts w:N ex-
t€,ded to include the mittary infrastnrcture of
the security forces in Kosovo and the support
struchres of the military forces (headquarters,
telecornmunications insallations, equipment and
munitions depots, barracks). Finally, the range of
NATO operations was further exended during
the third phase to include targets considered to be
srategic (power stations, military and civilian
communications, industrial infustructure).
(a) Lines of communication
10. From 12 to 18 April (days 20 to 28 of the
campaign) NATO mainly attacked communica-
tion lines or routes likely to be used by the
Yugoslav military forces. UK Defence Minister
George Robertson stated on 23 April that "some
of our princlpal targets have bee,n road and rail
bridges. Both major rail routes into Kosovo have
teotnory H. Cordesman, The lessons and non-les-
sons of the air otd missile wu in Kosovo, report to the
USAF)G StrateryForuq 20 Jnlyl999, CSIS, p 56.
3 
"Operation Allied Forcen, Mititary Analysis Net-
work, pp 1-8.
been cut and t'wo of the four major roads". The
aim of this new approach to the air campaign
was also to influence public opinion in Yugosla-
via, as explained by Rear Admiral Thomas Wil-
sono during the briefing of 22 Aprrl: "The darn-
age to the lines of comnrunication as well as the
psychological effect of seeing them destroyed is
atrecting [...] the auitude of mobilisation..."5.
1I. However, Iittle information was give,n on
the strikes against lines of communication and
military routes. NATO publistred a low- and med-
ium-intensity damage assessmexf on 2l Apnl,
but no map showing the differe,nt targets was
prese,nted. General Wesley Cla* (SACELJR) sta-
ted on 27 Aprnthat "I{ATO had now hit 37 brid-
ges".
12. The details concerning the stikes against
lines of cornnunication only beca:me official on
30 April. According to a Pentagon rqort on that
date, 20 major routes, 8 rail routes et 2 main
bridges were either destroyed or seriously dam-
aged. On 5 May, the British Defence Minister
stated that 32 road and rail bridges had beeir
damaged or destroyd which was subseque,ntly
confirmed by NATO. At the end of the air strikes
on 10 June, the US Deparment of Defe,nse re-
ported 'taving inflicted moderate damage to
lines of communication throughout the country".
(b) Command and contol installations
13. Between 12 and 18 April, the rate of
NATO attacks onthe Serb comrnand and control
installations increased by 124%. On22 ApriJ, the
United States a::nounced that it had selected no
fewer than 27 mjor targets, and ttrat it had in-
flicted serious damage on national comrnand and
control systems, the special police and interior
ministry, the capabilities of the Firsg Second and
Third Armies, ttre air defence headquarters and
comnumd posts and the airborne headquarters.
Most of the stikes were directed against the
Third Army, which was the main operational
force in Kosovo. However, the comrnand and
confrol facilities targeted by NATO also included
President Milosevic's reside,nces, the socialist
party headquarters, the main headquarters of the
security forces and various dual-use installations,
affi.r 
of the United States Joint Chiefs of Suff.
s Antlrony It Cordesrnan, The lessons utd non-lessons
of the air and missile wu in Koswo, report to the
USAF)(P StrategyFonurg 20 Jnly 1999, CSIS.
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in other words, radio and television stations and
the telephone network.
14. During the briefing of 22 Apd Rear
Admiml Thomas Wfuon announcd "...we have
both degraded the effectiveness and the efficie,lrcy
ofthis overall command and conuol networlg the
national command authority, and in doing so
have sent strong messages to certain eleme,lrts, in
fuct aI echelons of comrnand, tlrat we will attack
where and when we can to disrupt or degrade
their ability to comrnand these forces". He went
on to state that'lthe MUP facilities in downtown
Belgrade were destroyed. (...) Key army-level
and corps-level military comnumd and contol
installations and headquarters have beeir de-
stroyed. The First Army, the Speciat Corps, an
airbome unit in Nis, Third Army headquarters,
which is controlling operations in Kosovo and, of
course, the air defe,nce headquarters and com-
mand post have beeir attacked as well". At the
end of the NATO air stikes on 10 June, the US
Deparnnent of Defense reported that the Serb
operational capability was in poor condition.
2. The results of the NATO ab s.trikes
15. During the 78 days of air strikes, ttre rate
of attack was irregular, but perfectly reflected the
logic of a war which had initially besn intEnded
to be a swift one. Indeed, there was a relatively
large number of strikes on the first day 
- 
150.
From I to 7 May, ttre number regularly de-
creased from 150, to 100 per day. During the
second phase from 8 ta 29 May, there was a
linear increase from 100 to over 250 strikes each
day, reaching a peak around 29 to 30 May.
Dunng the third phase of ttre conflict from 30
May to 7 June, the rate suddenly decreased from
over 250 to less than 100 per day. Finally, dunng
the last phase from 7 to l0 June, NATO consid-
erably increased the number of stikes from 90 to
about 170 a dolt'.General Wesley Clark an-
nounced to joumalists during the presentation of
NATO's official air strike evaluation report:
'"The results are not so far off what we believed
them to be at the end of the waf". According to
rArrthooy H. Cordesman, The lessons and non-
lessons of the air and missile wm in Kosovo, CSIS,
revised 20 Juty 1999, Figure I, Figure 4 "Oyerall
pattems in weather duririg the air and missile cam-
paigl".
' Source: NATO briefing of 16 September 1999,
www.nato.int
the official NATO figures, 93 taxls, 153 ar-
moured vehicles, 339 military vehicles and 389
artillery pieces and mortars had been destroyed.
16. However, the American weekly US News
and World Report reported in its 20 Septenrber
1999 issuet that "a NATO team that visited 900
aim points targeted by NATO in Kosovo found
carc:nses of only 25 tarks and similar-looking
self-propelled artillery pieces; after the war,
NATO claimed it destroyed 110". According to
this review, "some NATO analysts thirk pilots
hit many more decoys than at first thought 
- 
and
that Serbs may have sexil damaged tanks out to
be stnrck over and over. The Air Force has de-
duced from pilots' rq)orts, cockpit videos and
intelligence sensors that measure the plumes from
explosions on the ground that they really de-
stroyed at least 75 tanks, accordi4g to a NATO
official"e. Indee4 on the ground the Serbs
showed themselves to be experts at the art of
camouflage and decoys. '"Ihe decoys were often
surror:nded by anti-aircraft artillery and gunners
with shoulder-fired missiles who hoped to lure
NATO jets into a deadly tap. NATO never lost
a plane to this nrse, although allied pilo* did
bomb a number of decoys"lo.
17. NATO losses were minimal. The Serbs'
greatest achiweme,ff was to shoot down two
American aircraft, including an F-1I7 Stealth.
Pentagcm officials think that both aircraft were
hit by a missile fired from ttre stationary SA-air
defence syst€xns. 'NATO pilots have long honed
their tactics for evading and suppressing those
1960s+ra missiles, but Serbs used some tech-
niques not in the playbook {1 . The Pentagon of-
ficials' reaction to this incidelrt was simply,
"They got lucky'{2.
B. Dqloymmtof KFOR
18. The Ra:nbouillet Accords already made
provision for the deploynent of a military force
in the Kosovo region. The conditions of the
ceasefire between NATO and the FRY, set out in
the "Military Technical Agreeme,ff" of 9 June
W_
e *The bombs that failed in Kosovo", World report,
20 September 1999.
'o "Tricky urgeting tactics surprised both sides",
Vl/orld Report,5 May 1999.
tt lbid.
" Ibid.
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1999, were somewhat different from the original
agreemexrt and the operations of the Kosovo
Force (KFOR) were resricted to the territory of
Kosovo alone. UN Security Cor:ncil Resolution
1244 pavd, the way for the deployrrent of an
"international security force", of which KFOR
formed the core. The arrival of Russian troops at
Pristina airport (Statina) and the desire expressed
by the Russian authorities to maintain a substan-
tial military presexrce in Kosovo led to the sig.a-
ture on 18 June, between the United States and
Russia, of an "agree,me,lrt on Russian participa-
tion in the intemational security force". These
three texts together provide the framework for
KFOR operations, although they contain a ilrm-
ber of points which remainunclear.
1. The NATO-RY Mililory TechnicalAgeement
19. Signed on 9 June folowing two days of
inteirsive discussions, the "Military Technical
Agreeinent bstween the Intemational Security
Force (KFOR) and the governme,rts of the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia and the Repubtc of
Serbia" paved the way for the deployment of
Alliance forces. This technical agreement also
contains a number of political points which tsm-
porarily limit Yugoslavia's sovereignty over the
territory of Kosovo. What is striking about this
text is that it imposes KFOR as the only interna-
tional force pres€nt on the groun4 although
Resolution 1244, adopted on l0 June, theoreti-
cally allows any UN mernber state to be present
in Kosovo. The KFOR acronym is systematically
used in conjunction with the term "intemational
security force" to make it clear that they refer to
one andthe same force.
20. The agreerre,lrt contains six articles and
two annexes, one on the gadual withdrawal of
the Yugoslav military, pararrilitary and security
forces, and the second on KFOR operations in
Kosovo. It establishes two safety zones, a25 kn
air safety zone (ASZ) starting at the border be-
tweexr Kosovo and the FRY and a 5 kn ground
safety zone (GSZ). The agreeme,nt entered into
force immediately after being signed by the two
parties. The Yugoslav forces withdrew from
Kosovo on the basis of three zones which were
defined in the first zumex. An tlday period was
granted in which to complete the entire with-
drawal, but only three days were give,:r for the
Yugoslav air and air defence forces.
21. Furthermorg the documelrt explains the
objectives of KFOR:
"(...) to establish and maintain a secure
e,nvironme,nt for all citizens of Kosovo
and otherwise carry out its missioil3;
(...) to contribute to a secure e,lrviron-
ment for the international civil imple-
mentation presence, and other interna-
tional organisations, age,lrcies, and non-
govenrmental organisationsr a ;
(...) provide appropriate contol of the
borders of FRY in Kosovo with Alba-
nia and FYROM until the arrival ofthe
civilian mission of the UN"15.
2. W Security Council Resohtlion 1244
(10 June 1999)
22. Resolution 1244 rcroadively provided a
legal basis for NATO action in Kosovo and e,lr-
abled the peaceful deployrnent of KFOR How-
ever, there are a number of points on which the
text is open to conflicting interpretations, maki4g
the quest for a satisfactory solution for Kosovo's
fuuue even more complex. A conte,lrtious poing
for example, is how much value can be attached
to the "(...) commitne,nt of all me,mber states to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Rspublic of Yugoslavia (... )" when there
is a de facto physical, political and economic
separation on the ground betwe€n Kosovo and
the FRY. The call "for substantial autonomy and
meaningfirl self-adrninistration for Kosovo" is
also catled into question by the increasing role in
the administration of Kosovo that has beeir ac-
corded to the KLA whose sole objective is inde-
pe,ndence.
23. The tasks of the international securiry
force are defined in eight pointsr5:
*(a) detemrry renewed hostilities, main-
t^ining and where necessary enforcing and
ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the
return into Kosovo of Federal and Repub-
lic military, police and paramilitary forces,
except as provided in point 6 of Annex 2;
ffi.r. I : General obligations ; g2.
la Article t : General obligations ; $4.
" Article II : Cessation of hostilities ; S2-L16 UN Security Council Resolution l2M of l0 June
199e, 59.
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(b) delr:rl[ttarusing the Kosovo Liberation
Anny (KtA) and other armed Kosovo Al-
banian groups (...);
(c/ establishing a secure environme,nt in
which refugees and displaced persom can
rstum home in safety, the international
civil presence can operate, a tansitional
administration can be establishd and hu-
manitarian aid can be delivered;
(d/ ensuring public safety and order until
the international civil presence can take re-
sponsibility for this tash
(e/ supervising demining until the interna-
tional civil prese,nce can, as appropriate,
take over responsibility for this task;
(f supporting, as appropriatg and coordi-
nating closely with the work of the inter-
national civil presence;
(g/ conducting border-monitoring duties as
required;
(h) q$nagthe protection and freedom of
moverrcril of i*elf, ttre international civil
prese,nce, and other intemational organisa-
tions".
24. Thus the intemational security force, con-
sisting of KFOR alone, finds itself confronted
withtastrs which go beyond conve,ntional military
duties. Enforcing law and order and monitoring
borders take up most of its human resources and
put it in the front line of inter-ethnic violence, as
was the case in tle town of Mirovica. Having to
perform such policing tasks at a time whe,n the
security situation of the Serb and Rom minorities
is deteriorating, makes KFOR suspect in the eyes
of those two communities which consider it to be
biased. This could well tigger selfdefence
mechanisms which would make the intemal sit-
uation even more dangerous.
25. Annex 2 to the Resolution also provides
forthe rehrrn of an unspecified number of Yugo-
slav security sta^ff to fulfil the following func-
tionsrT:
"liaison with the international civil mis-
sion and the international security pre-
sence;
marking/clearing minefi elds ;
rAono2, 
56.
maintaining a pres€,nce at Serb pafii-
monial sites;
- 
maintainmg a prese,nce at key border
crossings".
26. The conditions and scale of tlris return
remain a source of friction between the Serb and
Yugoslav authorities on the one hand, and the
UN and KFOR local administrations, on the
other. The growing role the KLA is accorded in
the Kosovo Protection Corps, in which practi-
cally no other minority is representod, aggravates
the feeling of insecurity among the non-Albanian
population and makes their medium-term pros-
pects for re,rnaining in Kosovo look uncertairu
while the abse,nce of Yugoslav forces, wen in the
form of a toke,n pres€nce, re,prese,1fts a challenge
to theterritorial intcgrrty of the FRY.
3. The special case of the Rassianforces
27. The Russian Federation took a negative
view ofthe NATO operation from the outset. Its
diplomatic efforts, together with those of other
European states, led to the adoption by the G-8
on 6 May 1999, in Petersberg, of seven prin-
ciples, which were agreed to by the FRY auth-
orities on 2 June18. Immediately after the adop-
tion of IJN Security Council Resolution 1244,
some of the Russian forces stationed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina crossed the border into tIrc FRY
and headed towards Pristina. This operation,
which was prepared with the utnost secrecy and
-* 
*tmmediate and verifiable end of violence and
rqxession in Kosovo; withdrawal from Kosovo of
military, police and paramilitary forces; deployment
in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United
Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of
the common objectives; establishment of an interim
adminiscration for Kosovo to be decided by the
Security Council of the United Nations to ensure
conditions for a peacefirl and normal life for all
inhabitants in Kosovo; the safe and free return of all
refugees and displaced persons sa6 unimpeded
access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations;
a political process towards the establishment of an
interim political framework agreement providing for
a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full
account of the Rambouillet Accords and the prin-
ciples of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other coun-
tries of the region, and the demiliurisation of the
KLA; comprehensive approach to the economic dev-
elopment and stabilization of the crisis region".
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without the lnowledge of either the Russian pol-
itical authorities or the Alliance, caused conster-
nation:Lmong the NATO forces. We know today
that the Commander of IGO& most of whose
installations and eqtripment were on the territory
of the Fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
refused to obey SACEUR's order to prevent the
Russian forces from taking possession of Pristina
airport (Slatina).
28. Faced with a fait accomph, the United
States authorities decided to negotiate the ar-
rangqne,fis for the participation of Russian
forces in KFOR directty with the Russian Fed-
eration. An accord was signed in Helsinki on 18
June 1999 on "Agreed principles for Russian
participation in the intffnational security force
(KFOR) for Kosovo". While reaffming KFOR's
unity of command, the docume,nt nonetheless
concedes that "(...) the Russian contingent in
Kosovo will be under political and military con-
frol of the Russian Command". The number of
Russian forces is set at *five battalions with a
total strength not exceeding 2 850 roops, plus up
to 750 toops for the airfield and logisics base
operation combined, plus 15 liaison officers"le.
Their operating zones are in the German (Mali-
sevo), American (Kosovska IGmenica) and French
(Lausa) sectors respectively. A logistics base has
been established in Kosovo Polje. The direction
of operations in the Pristina airport area is shared
between KFOR andthe Russian forces, underthe
auspices of a "Director of Kosovo Air Opera-
tions working forthe KFOR Commander".
29. This agreeme,nt also provided a basis for
reopening the military dialogue betwee,n the
Russian Federation and NATO, which had been
broken offatthe beginning of the air carrpaign in
the FRY. It contains the following provisions
concerning liaison with the Russian forces par-
ticipating in KFOR:
"(a) Russia will rehun the Russian Mili-
tary Represeirtative to SFIAPE, augmelft
his staff and expand their responsibilities
to include Russian participation in KFOR.
The Russian represeirtation will consist of
up to 10 officers;
%g...a points on Russian participation in KFO&
Helsinki" 18 June 1999, mrnr.nato.int/kosovo
(6/ Russia will establish a liaison goup
with HQ AFSOUTH. The Russian liaison
group will consist ofthree officers"2o.
30. To date, Russia's participation in KFOR
has gone fuirly smoothly, with the exception of
one incident involving the relief of Dutch fioops
in Orahovac. Faced with opposition from the
local ethnic dllenian population, publicly sup-
ported by the KLA the Russian forces gave up
the attempt to deploy after five days of discus-
siorrs (22-27 August 1999). On 5 September, a
Russian pafiol intervened in a confrontation be-
tween Serbs and flanians and used force in
legitimate selfdefe,nce, killing three Serbs, one of
whom was carrying documents proving that he
belonged to the Yugoslav security forces.
4. Theresults of KFOR's d"pl"yn"nt
31. On 10 June 1999, fo[owing the signatue
of the Militaxy Technical and the
adoption of Resolution 1244, the North Atlantic
Council authorised the launch of Operation Joint
Guardian, of which the objectives2r are to:
"sstaUish a security prese,nce in Kos-
ovo, as authorised by the UN Security
Council Resolution ([JNSCR) 1244 afi
ftfiber defined in the Mlitary Tdrnical
Agreerrent (MTA) signed by mititary
authorities from the Federal Republic
ofYugoslavia and NATO;
veri$ and e,nforce the terms of the
MTA
establish a secure environme,nt in which
refugees and displaced persons can re-
turn home in safety;
establish a seque environme,nt in which
the intemational civil prese,lrce can op-
erate, a ransitional adrninistration can
be established and humanitarian aid
can be delivered;
help achieve a self-sustaining secure
e,nvironme,nt which will allow public
security responsibilities to be trans-
6ffioo arrangements for participation of Russian
forces in KFOR attachment 6, Helsinki, 18 June
I 9 99, www. nato. int/kosovo
21 NATO, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTI{),
umm. afsouth- nato. int. int/ldor
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ferred to appropriate civil organisa-
tions".
KFOR is the land componeft of the operation,
which also has naval and air support.
32. On Kosovo territory there are military
units from 2l statssn, tota[ing almost 40 000
troops. The KIOR headquarters is in Pristina
and Kosovo has been divided into five zones:
- 
Nortb in the region of Kosovska M-
tovic4 under the responsibility of France
(7 000 );
South, in the region of Prizrerl under
the responsibility of Gennany (8 000);
- 
West, in the region of Pec, under the
responsibility of Italy (6 000);
Ce,nte, in the region of Pristin4 under
the responsibifity of the United King-
dom (8 000);
East, in the region of Gnjilane, under
the responsibility of the United States
(6 000).
33. KFOR's deployment started on 12 June
and has gone smoothly, with the exception of a
few isolated sncounters with elemexrts of the
withdrawing Serb security forces. Nevertheless,
KFOR was unable, during ttre first few days of
its deploymeng to prevent acts of revenge or ban-
ditry committed by ethnic Albanians belonging,
or claiming to belong, to the KLA. This pro-
voked a nuns exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, fol-
Iowed by menrbers of the Rom community and of
other ethnic minorities. Given the absence of
represe,ntatives of the United Nations, OSCE and
European Unio4 responsible for the political and
economic stabilisation of Kosovo, the policing
and reconsfrtrction tasks fell initially to KFOR.
34. Its efforts to maintain law and order have
sometimes led to limited confrontations with
KLA elemerils, who seized upon the vacuum
created by the deparnrre of the Yugoslav security
forces to establish their own political, adminis-
tative and economic power base in Kosovo. To
' n.fgr-"rr,, Canad4 the Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Nonray, Polan4 Pornrgal, Spair; Turkey,
the United Kingdom and United States (NATO) and
Austriq Finlan4 Russia and the United Arab
Emimtes (non-NATO): www.afsouth. nato.int/ldor
date, the mo$ dimcuh situation has been tlre one
confronting the French toops in Miuovic4 a
town divided between etlnic Albanians and a still
sizeable Serb minority. All over Kosovo, a con-
siderable share of the KFOR resources is dwoted
to protecting minority gloups unable to protect
themselves.
35. Relations between KFORandthe KLA are
a delicate issue, for the prese,nce of an interna-
tional security force represexfs a major obstacle
to the independence for Kosovo that is the KLA's
declared aim. KFOR's impartiality may e,ncour-
age Serbs and the members of other ethnic mi-
norities who have fled to neighbouring counffies
to rehrn. The IGOR prese,nce, like that of
SFOR in Bosniq preserves the status quo, pad-
ing changes in the FRY's intemal political situa-
tion, which will determine the fuurre status of
Kosovo. The period ttrat began with tle deploy-
me,nt of KFOR in Kosovo is fraught with uncer-
tainty, particularly as regards ttre security of
Kosovo and ofthe Balkan region as a whole.
III. Security problems in Kosan
36. 'Iile emerge from this conflict neither
satisfied nor complaceng but rather determined.
There are far too many dead taumatised and
abused people for any other e,motion. Added
evidence of the extent of Mr Milosovec's crimes
may come to light in Kosovo's new dawn. And
as we have lea:ned in Bosni4 when conflict e,nds,
ttre eve,n more difficult job of winning the peace
begins'8. With these words at the eird of the
conflict between NATO and the FRY, US Secre-
tary of State Madeleine Albright summed up the
difficulty of the task of rebuilding Kosovo and
the problems it poses for the funre stability of
the region.
37. One of the aims of the NATO operation
was to "stop the killing and achieve a durable
peace that prevents furtlrer repression and pro-
vides for democratic self-governmant for the
Kosovar people"2a. Although the viole,nce perye-
tated by the Yugoslav authorities against Kos-
ovo's Albanian majority ended with KFOR's ar-
rival and the departure of the Yugoslav military
f;woll st 
""tJournal,l4 June 1999.24 (US and NATO objectives and interests in Kos-
ovo", IJS State De?afinefi. 26 March 1999.
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and police forces, the task of establishing a "dur-
able peace" ,nd "self-govenmerlt" in an r:nstable
and viole,nt situation remains. At the same time,
those who live in fear are now in the other qlmp,
only this time the sthnic groups tlat are victims
of violeirce have no protection, for there is no
Serb or Rom equivalent of the KLA. Moreover,
it is difficulq folowing the support given by
some European governmexfs and the United
States to the Kosovar Albanian population before
and afterthe conflicq to explain 1s public opinion
that members of that same community are now
the,mselves responsible for acts of violence ag-
ains minority groups in Kosovo. While some
Yugoslav military and civilian authorities and
other ele,me,nts were clearly to blame for oppres-
srng the Albanian population, their guilt has now
been exte,nded to the whole community.
38. In order to maintain the se,lnblance of a
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, if that is the ap-
propriate term whe,n over 90Yo of the population
belongs to the same ethnic goup, it is vital to
protect the safety of minority groups. KFOR and
UN police forces play a cnrcial part in that re-
spect. Another issue is the economic situation.
From 1989 te 1999, Kosovo's Albanian popula-
tion, excluded from the region's decision-making
bodies, dweloped its ovnq parallel structures in
the fields of education, health and rade. These
covered the basic needs of most of the Albanian
population, particularly in urban areas. More-
over, the funds sent by the Kosovar Albanian
diaspor4 together with iutemational aid, pro-
vided the with a not inconsiderable
source ofsupport.
39. The Serb minority, particularly in urban
areas, faces economic and social hardship fol-
lowing the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from
Kosovo. Since it does not have the same support
from inside or outside the community, its contin-
ued existe,nce is threatened and it is only the on-
going economic crisis in the FRY which prevents
fu me,rnbers from leaving Kosovo altogettrer.
Economic reconstruction in Kosovo, if it is pur-
sued without discrimination, will help improve
the security situation for minorities and reduce
mistnrst between the different sthnic groups.
Finally there is a political dimension to the inter-
national community's work in Kosovo, which has
the Usk of building represe,ntative institntions
and developrng a dialogue :unong the differe,lrt
ethnic groups.
A. The role of KFOR in stabiliskg Kosovo
40. The decision to launch NATO air strikes
against the FRY was taken by the Norttr Atlantic
Council alone and carried out by the military
stnrctures of ttre Atlantic Alliance. The admini-
stration of Kosovo, which remains a part of the
FRY, is the responsibility of the United Nations,
which operates through LJNMIK (United Nations
Interim Mission in Kosovo), in cooperation with
the European Union and the OSCE. The United
Nations is also responsible for maintaining law
and order by means of an international police
force which it is the task of the OSCE to train.
KFOR operations in Kosovo must therefore take
account ofthe different views and agerldas of the
other organisations prese;nt in the region.
41. Two other important factors must be bome
in mind for any intemational action in the region.
One is the part played by the KLA in the man-
agerneff of the region's affairs, the other is the
development of the internal situation in the FRY
and the need to define a new status for Kosovo.
The future of the KLd whose military structure
was supposed to have been disbanded on 19 Sep-
ternber 1999, was decided by an agreement con-
cluded bstween the KLA and KFOR on 20 June
1999, in compliance with the provisions contain-
ed in LiN Security Council Resolution 1244.
Kosovo's status is a matter for a futrre decision
by the Security Council, which will also take ac-
count ofthe opinion ofthe FRY, without which it
would not be possible to achieve the consensus
needed for the adoption of a resolution.
1. Internal securiryt in Kosovo
42. "Around 30 people are being killed each
week in Kosovo, where a lack of police and a
justice systfir have contibuted to a 'vacuum of
law and order"'x. The rapid departure of the
Yugoslav security forces left the Serb civilian
population defenceless against the Albanian ma-
jority and elements of the KLd while KFO& in
the process of deployment and concerned with
the safety of its owntoops, did not have the time
to intervene betwe€n the various communities.
After a decade of repression dunng which the
rights of the ethnic Albanian and other minori-
ties, mainly Muslim Serbs, had beeir trampled
org a desire for revange was to be expected.
What is less excusable is the failure of the inter-
4-\IAPEN"rr,2Augustlggg,www.shape.nato.iru
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national communityto take the necessary steps to
contain and alleviate the violence.
43. This was acknowledged by KFOR Com-
mander, Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jack-
son, in an interview with the Sunday Telegraph
on I August 1999, when he stated that 'too rumy,
Albanians haven't realised we're frying to do
something new and different here. Some Albani-
ans have behaved in a very similar way to those
who have just left. (...) It's no good pointing
your finger at me. KFOR is not the answer. We
are dorng all we can, but attitudes can't be
changed, thinking can't be changd with a sol-
dier'26.
44. Indeed, KFOR's arrival was not initially
followed up by civilian support from the United
Nations and the OSCE. The tasks of maintaining
law and order and repainng local infrastnrcnrre
damaged by the internal conflict and NATO
bombing fell to tlre international security force.
The Comrnander of the German forces based in
Prizren, General Wolfgang Sauer, told the Ber-
liner Zeitung, on 7 August 1999, that'there was
no law and order, no street cleaning and firune,n,
hospital staff and utilities ernployees were work-
ing without pay. Doctors, paramedics and nurs-
ing statr were receiving occasional payments of
100 German marks just so that they wouldn't
simply run away''27. The German troops carried
out policing tasks, repaired houses and roads and
performed demining operations.
45. It was only on 8 August, trryo months after
KFOR's arrival in Kosovo, that the first interna-
tional police units arrived and started their pa-
rols, mainly in Pristinas. It took until 7 Septerr,-
ber to instal I 024 police officers, although since
June the plan had been to send 3 0002e. During
those three months, ttre situation of the minorities
in Kosovo only worse,ned, leading to a process of
ethnic regrouping in the towns and villages, with
all the auendant problems of providing health
care and supplies to the people concernd and
education for their children. This mobilised part
of the resources of IGO\ which found itself
-' 
"J*kronr Albanians are as bad as Serbs", sunday
Telegraph, I August 1999.
n SIWE N"rt,8 August 1999, wruv.strape.nato.int
" Ibid,9 August 1999.D United Nations, UNlmq www.un-org@ce/kosovo/
pages/kosovo I.lEn, 7 Septernber I 999.
providing escorts and physical proteoion for the
Serb, Rom and other minorities.
46. The international police forces clearly do
not have the numerical strength needed to guar-
antee the safety of the some 100 000 members of
Kosovo's minority groups. The United Nations re-
ported on 7 September ttre prese,nce of some 500
policemen in Pristina (roughly 20 000 Serbs)3o, 49
in Mitovica (12 000 Serbs), 35 officers in Priz-
ren (150), 35 in Gnjilane (3 500), 25 in Pec (450)
and 78 on border policing duties. On 13 Septenrber,
the UNMIK international police force was dec-
lared operational for ttre regron of Pristina. On
22 Septeinber, UNMIK reported that I 400 pol-
ice officers were deployed in Kosovo3r.
47. In parallel the OSCE police taining op-
eration was launchd starting with 200 recruits,
of whom 17 were members of the minority
groups. This police force, due to attain a strength
of 3 000 officers, nonetheless risks being side-
lined by the Kosovo Protection Corps which has
succeeded the KLd which is also 3 000 strong,
plus 2 000 reservists. This new force, composed
almost entirely of ethnic Albanians and com-
manded by one of the KLA military leaders,
Agim Ceku, helped consolidate the power base of
this military and political organisation in Koso-
var Albania:r society.
2. Demilirorisotion of the fr,A
48. The KLAil has not been able during its
short existence (1997-99) to assert itself as a
credible partner either in the political dialogue
with the FRY authorities or with NATO, the
European Union and the individual states which
supported the cause of Kosovar Albanian auton-
omy. Militarily speaking, it ptayed a minor role
during ttre war and its action was successfully
countered by the Yugoslav forces. Its programme
of independence for Kosovo is not accepted by
some of the FRY's neighbouring states and also
calls into question the principle of preserving the
FRY's territorial integnty, enshrined in UN Se-
%.*"a assessnent of the situation of ethnic min-
orities in Kosovd': UNHCR OSCE, 6 Septunber 1999,
www.osce.orglkosovo/reportJminorities.htrn
3t UNIvmq satus report, 27 September 1999, www.
un. org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo_status. htrn
" The origins, struchrre, aims and activities of the
KLA are described in the Committee's prwious re-
port: "The situation in Kosovo", Assembly Doctt-
ment 1651, 10 June 1999.
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curity Council Resolution 1244. Wiftin the re-
gion itself the KLA is still distusted by part of
the Kosovar Albanian political class and in par-
ticular by Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League
of Kosovo.
49. However, the KLA is a factor that the
Kosovo intemational administration and KFOR
have to reckon wittU for it has the capacity to
destabilise ttre international presexrce. The solici-
tude shown by IGOR and the UN adrrinistration
for the KLA's political leader Hashim Thaci
illustrates his importance for tle internal stabili-
sation of Kosovo. The negotiations held on 19
Septeinber 1999 with a view to disbanding the
KLd auended by SACELJR in person, not only
demonsfrated the negotiating skills of the KLA'S
political and military leaders, but also its real
ability to obtain concessions from KFOR and the
UN local representatives.
50. Provision for the progra:nmed dissolution
of the KLA was made in UN Security Council
Resolution 1244 n paragraphs 9(b)33 and 153a.
An "Undertaking of demilitarisation and trans-
formation by the UCK (KLA)"35 was signed on
20 June by NATO (on behalf of KFOR) and the
KLA political and military leadership. This
agreefirent, like the abovementioned texts, con-
tains a number of ambiguous points which will
have conseque,nces for the futue of Kosovo and
regional stability. The docume,lrt provides for a
"ceasefire by the UCK (KLA), their disengage-
melfi from tlre zones of conflict, subsequent de-
militarisation and reintegration into civil society.
(...)" (paragraph l). KFOR's concem to assure
the safety of its forces and ttrat of the interna-
tional civil implementation presence vis-i-vis the
KLA ernerges clearly in paragraph 6@ of the
agreement:
%."ia.. that the responsibilities of the inter-
national security presence to be deployed and acting
in Kosovo will include: (...) Demiliurising the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian goups (...)".
3a 
"Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo
Albanian goups end immediately all offensive ac-
tions and comply with the requirements for demil-
itarisation as laid down by the head of ttre inter-
national security presence in consultation with the
Special Representative of the Secreury-General".
3s 
"Undertaking of demiliurisation qnd transformation
by the UCK', 20 June 1999, unrm.nato.int&osovo/
docu/a990620a-btnr
"6. The purposes of this Undertaking are
as follows :
(. )
@ To provide for the support and
authorisation of the KFOR (...) and to
conffibute to a secure environmelrt for the
intemational civil implernelrtation pres-
ence, and ottrer intemational organisations,
age,ncies, and non-governmeirtal organisa-
tions and the civil populace".
51. The agree,me,nt sets a 90day deadline for
derrilitarisation of the organisation and disband-
rng its military strucilres. It makes provision for
a joint committee headed by the KFOR Com-
mander and composed of senior officers from
KFOR and the KLA (thereby gving the lauer
"army status") and a representative of the civil-
ian adminisration in order to monitor the pro-
cess. This is tantamount to "political" r@og-
nition of the KLA by KFOR and UN represe,rr-
tatives. At the end of the agreeme,lrt are two
controversial poinr, contested by the FRY, stip-
ulating that'ttre international community should
take due and full account of the contibution of
the UCK (KLA) dunng the Kosovo crisis and
accordingly give due consideration to :
"(a) Recognition that, while the UCK
(KLA) and its structures are in the process
of ransformatiorq it is committed to pro-
pose individual curre,!il mernbers to par-
ticrpate in the adrninisration and police
forces of Kosovo, enjoying special consid-
eration in view of the expertise they have
developed;
(b) T}lie formation of an army in Kosovo
on the lines of the US National Guard in
due course as part of a political process
designed to determine Kosovo's future
status, taking into account the Rambouillet
Accord" (paragaph 25).
52. Give,n the crure,lrt situation in Kosovo,
recognition of the KLA and of its influence over
a large part of the Kosovar flenian community
is a logical solution to the proble,rn of assuring
the safety of KFOR and the intemational civil
implanentation prese,nce. As far as its achral
disarmament is concernd KFOR has assumed
the role of guarantor for that part of the agree-
ment. However, the KLA remains divided at
grass roots level on the derrilitarisation agree-
t4
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ment, and some local leaders might in ttre futue
contest the direction in which it is moving if the
quest for independence, which remains the aim of
the KLA leadership and is supported by other
Kosovar Albanian political forces, is not success-
ful in the medium tcrm. The interrational pres-
e,nce in Kosovo could in that case become a tar-
get for certain extremist Albanian elemerrts which
see it as an obstacle to independence.
3. Theluture of theinterndional
military presence in Kosovo
53. Following 78 days of air strikes and long
drawn-out diplomatic negotiations, KFOR toops
occupied the territory of Kosovo with a view to
helping resolve the problems of this province and
stabilising the region. Four months on, KFOR
and the international civilian presence in Kosovo
axe stnrggling with a whole host of probluns,
more of a political than milit ry nature, but
which have conseque,nces for the defence ar-
rangemexfs of the states involved in the opera-
tion. The basic question concerns the recourse to
military me2ns in order to solve the political,
economic and social problerns which are at the
root of the crises in fonner Yugoslavia.
54. If the point is to dernonsfiate that NATO
is making an effective contibution to regional
stability, then that has been proven beyond
doubg at least since the Bomian crisis. The
problem is that NATO does not have the civiliarU
police and economic asssts required to improve
and stabilise the situation in the reglon in the
medium and long term. Those tasks are left to
other, less integrated organisations within which
there are different assessme,ffs and conflicting
interests. A receirt precedent, since overshadowed
by the Kosovo crisis, was Bosnia and Herze-
govina.
55. Since 1995 
- 
first through IFOR and then
(1997\ SFOR 
- 
NATO has bee,n maintaining the
dernarcation lines betwee,n the Croat-Bosnian
Federation and Republika Srpska in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. A federal, bipartite govemmsnt
exists on paper, together with local governmerils
in Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka. The vari-
ous militia groups have been disarmed and in
exchange three official armies - Muslinr, Croat
and Serb 
- 
have been maintained. Little headway
has been made with integrating the Croat and
Muslim armed forces, in spite of American ef-
forts. The economy relies on international ai4
unemployment stands at 40o/o in the Croat-
Bosnian Federation and probably wen higher in
the Republika Srpska.
56. [n view of eveirts in Bomia and Herze-
govrna it is important to avoid repeating past
mistakes conceming the use of force to resolve
intemal conflicts. krdeed, the task of reorganisa-
tion and reconsfuction cannot be performed
without taking into account the specific regional
situation in terms of the coexistence of different
ethnic and religious conmrmities. Kosovo's prob-
lems did not begin in 1989, they existed even
before Slobodan Milosevic cilme to power. There
was never any real symbiosis between the etbnic
Albanian and Serb communities and there was
little mixing between the two groups, conaary to
the situation in Bosnia" where there was a certain
amount of ethnic mixing. Currently, in Kosovo, it
is important for the LJN administration to assert
its authority and enforce the provisions of Reso-
lution 1244, without which there is a possibility
that UN interve,ntion might no longer be accepted
in similar conflicts on the continent of Europe.
57. The "Kosovo effest" is already being felt
in the Russian Federation in connection with
Chechnya. No UN agsncy has so far been auth-
orised to move into the area and there has been
no response to the offers of assistance to refugees
made by the OSCE and EU, contrary to what
happened n 1994. This is probably due, among
olre1 things, to the sirme concern for ensuring
respect for territorial integrity as that felt by the
FRY with regardto Kosovo. Moreover, the inter-
pretation of that principle varies according to the
power srucnres in Europe. [n the case of
Croatia and of Bomia and Herzegovina" it was
srictly applied at the cost of mass expulsions of
the Serb population in the first instance and of a
physical separation of ttre three groups 
- 
Bos-
nian, Serb and Croat 
- 
in the second case. For
the mome,nt this is an unlnown fastor as far as
Kosovo is concerned, but the fact that double
standards are applied when judging et}ufc Alba-
nians (all victims) or Serbs (all perpetrators) will
in the long nrn make it difficult to comply with.
the stated aim of Resolution 1244, which is to
keep Kosovo in the FRY. Yet the principle of
territorial integrity is one of the founding prin-
ciples of all modern states, including the me,:nber
states ofthe European Union.
l5
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58. If the territorial integrity of a state is to be
maintained, there mustbe an agreed and accepted
link with a ce,ntal political authority. The prob-
lem is that in some cases, the imbalance betweerl
different population grcups can make it difficult
to create or maintain such a link in the absence of
common imerests. In such instances mediation 
-
backed up by practical economic and political
proposals and measures 
- 
is essential. In ttre par-
ticular geographic context of the Balkans, the key
to finding a solution to the problems rests with
the FRY and Albania. To completely discount
Serbia or apply an "Iraqi-style" policy of con-
tainment is a dubious solution in terms both of
time and effective,ness. Moreover, this will have
negative repercussions in the short and medium
terrq in that it will put presflre on the economy
of the former Yugoslavia Republic of Mace-
doniA and on those of Bulgaria and Romani4
thereby jeopadising the political developme,nt of
those states and their rapprochement wifr,NATO
and the EU. As far as Albania is concenrd
internal political instabilily, compounded by a
weak economy and the uncontrolled proliferation
of weapons may escalate into armed conflict, as
it did in 1997, unless there are more energetic
diplomatic efforts on the part of the EU menrber
states.
59. The situation is all the more worrying in
view of the fact that current stability depends
almost entirely on the deployment of NATO and
other national forces in the regon, without there
being any real exit strategy. Moreover, any state
can take a unilateral decision to withdraw at any
time, which is what happe,ned in 1995 whe,n the
United States decided it would no longer partici-
pate in ttre UN embargo on arms deliveries to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. [t cannot be taken for
ganted that the situation will improve, and with-
out considerable economic and social develop-
me,ft in the regron, together with real prospects
for integration in the EU or rapprochement with
iq we may see a firther disintegration of former
Yugoslavi4 with negative repercussions for
FYROM36 and other south+astern European
states. The prese,nce of intemational fioops must
not become an end in itself. Rather, it must be
* See--tt e articles entitled "Macedonia presidential
campaign dominated by Kosovo" and "Macedonia's
Petkovski warns against free Kosovo", Albanian
Daily News,29 October and Central Europe Online,
www.centralenrqpe.com, I November 1999.
part of a cohere,nt and ge,nerous overall strategy
which is attentive to the real needs of the popula-
tion. This is a task for the EU and indeed it rep-
resents 
- 
above and beyond all the fine words 
-
the first real test of the new Common Foreign
and Security Policy announced in the Cologne
Declaration.
B. Lessonsfor Earopeor
60. The Kosovo war has given rise to many
conflicting assessmexts and interpretations of the
factors responsible for victory (air power,
NATO's unity and determination, the role of the
Russian Federation, for example). All this has
consequexrces for Europe's plans in the field of a
common security and defence and for the fuure
ofransatlantic relations. The effects will be most
sEongly felt and enduring in the latter case, for
this war brought home in no uncertain terms the
technological and doctrinal gap between the
United States and the other mernbers of the AIli-
ance. The complexity of the multinational deci-
sion-making process and the differences of opin-
ion betwe€n Europeans and Americans, including
military leaders3T, are differe,nt facets of the sarne
problem. Indee,( it dates back to the 1980s when
the United States e,nrbarked on a far-reachi4g
reform of its armed forces and defence industries,
with a particular focus on new technologies, the
effects of which can be felt today in the way it
deploys its military strength.
51. Progress in the fields of satellites, raila4
guidance systems and information technology has
led to charges in the American military mind-set
and vindicated those who advocate the use of air
power. The conflicts in the Gul{ Bomia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo provided the opportu-
nity to de,monstrate not only the possibilities but
also the limitations of 'technological" warfare
with "zero fatalities", limited losses in terrrs of
materiel and a more 'huma,ne" approach by av-
oiding "collateral damage", in other words, cas-
ualties :Lmong tle e,nemy's civilian population.
The aim of such warfare is no longer to occupy
"etrremy" territory and force its population into
submission, but rather to force a government to
change its domestic or foreign policy, or even to
bring that govemmexrt down, without having to
intervene directly onthe ground.
37 Irrd*d there were also differences of appreciation
between SACEUR and the Pentagon, particularly
with regard to the use of airpower.
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62. This is the policy, dready applied to Iraq,
which the United States advocates for Serbia. In
both cases the aim is to bring about an internal
chalge, rsplacing a "hostile" govemment with a
"friendly'' one, or at least one that is more sym-
pathetic to the political objectives of the United
States, in the fust instance, and of NATO and
the EU in the second. One may, howeveE well
ask whether the hoped-for results are worth the
sacrifices imposed on the civilian population.
Saddam Hussein's regime, were it to fall, would
not be replaced by a dernocratic govemmexft in
that part of the world in which only Turkey and
Iran elect their leaders and accept changes of
govemmeril to some degree. Similarly, if the
preseril Serbian governme,lrt were to be replaced
by represe,ntatives of the opposition parties, this
would not necessarily mean ttre unconditional
acce,ptance of independe,nce for Kosovo, which is
the long-term objective of all srands of Kosovar
Albeni an political opinion.
1. Transdlanlic reldions afier Kosovo
63. Six months after the cessation of hostili-
ties, each of the major NATO mernbers is trying
to draw its own conclusions from the war in Kos-
ovo. While ttreir military assessme,Iils look simi-
lar, they do not all agree on the approach to be
adopted in the case of futue operations of the
s:rme qpe or of a larger-scale conflict.
(i) The United States
64. ln the published summary of its "Kosovo
After-Action Review"3t, the US Defense Depart-
ment focused on two points: "Alliance and coal-
ition warfare" and "Deployment employme,lrt
and sustainme,lrt":
'NATO's int€mal command reliationships
had not been used previously to plan and
conduct sustained combat operations. Par-
allel US and NATO comrnand and confrol
structures and systems complicated oper-
ational planning and maintenance of unity
of comrnand.
The US needs to work with allies to:
F.nharrce NATO's contingency plaming
process for non-Article V operations (op-
erations that do not involve an arrred
ffir*i"* of the resuls of the war is stilt under
preparation: www. defenselink mi I
attack against one or more of NATO
members);
Develop an overarching comrnand and
contol policy;
Enhance procedures and conduct exercises
NATO's political-military
interfaces.
Operation Allied Force would not have
been possible to conduct without the use of
our allies' military infrastructure, includ-
ing military bases, airfie1ds, and airspace.
Disparities between US capabilities and
those of our allies, hsluding precision
strike, mobility, and command, contol,
and communications capabffies had the
effect of impeding US ability to operate at
optimal effective,ness with NATO allies.
Successful implemeirtation of the Defe,lrse
Capabilities lnitiative must remain one of
NATO's top priorities because it will en-
hance allied military capabilities in five
key areas: deployability and mobility, sus-
tainability and logistics, effective el€age-
menq survivability of forces and infra-
stnrcture, and C2 and information sys-
terns3e.
DoD needs to develop options for earlier
and more efficient use of the capabilities
reside,nt in its reserve forces.
The C-I7 made the concept of direct deliv-
ery the strategic air movement of cargo -
from an aerial port of errbarkation to an
airfield as close as practicable to the final
destination 
- 
a reality.
DoD systems for planning and executing
fiansportation of its forces were strained
by the rapidly evolving requireme,lrts. DoD
is responding by improving its ongoing
programmes to provide automateq rapid-
response fi ansportation planning.
When possible, increased use of sealift as-
sets should be considered in future con-
fl icts and continge,ncies.
One of the most useful communications
capabffies was provided by the wide-
3-"tasao^ I-€amed from Kosovo", www.defense-
linkmil
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band disse,rnination syst€rn, an advanced
conce,pt technology deinonstration used ex-
tensively throughout the conflict for rap-
idly tanmduing high-priority imagery of
emerging targets.
The allied air offensive was zustained an4
in fact, expanded because we maintained
pressure on their air defence systems, for-
crng the Serbians to ke€p their systems
hidden under most circumstances and to
use defensive tactics that limited the sys-
tgms' effectiveness.
The heayy commitne,lffi of NATO's air de-
fense suppression forces indicates we need
to find innovative and affordable ways to
exploit our technologcal skills in elec-
tronic combat to bring gleater pressure to
bear on a futue enemy's air defense sys-
tem.
Success using these latest generation of
airdelivered munitions systems (e.g., Joint
Direct Attack Munition (IDAM)) in Kos-
ovo validates production plans to increase
inveirtories.
The conduct of an integrated inforrration
operations campaign was delayed by the
lack of both advance planning and strate-
gic guidance defining key objectives'4o.
65. The Pentagon analysts also srressed that:
"(...) New technologies, such as video im-
agery from munitions in the terminal at-
tack phase, will likely help improve battle
damage assessmexf performance in the fu-
ture, but a substantial degree of uncer-
tainty wil continue to exist in any fuure
war.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were
used to an unprecedented degree in Opera-
tion Allied Force. hnproved mission plan-
ning, improved processes for interaction
between UAV operators and manned air-
craft, frequent and realistic taining oppor-
tunities, and equipme,nt upgrades for indi-
vidual UAVs all wouldbe,nefit funre force
effectiveness.
%r 'nqtoymerrt ernployment anrt sustainment'',
umw.defenselink.mil
(...) Humanitarian operations connected to
the Kosovo crisis highlighted the impor-
tance of such resources as linguists and
civil affairs personnel engineering assets
capable of emergency repair of roads and
bridges in very austere e,lrvironme,lrts, de-
tailed maps of the relevant areas and pre-
positioned stocks of teirts and water blad-
ders.
The capability of US forces to achieve
outstanding mission success must be tem-
pered by an understanding of the indirect
costs in terms of reduced readiness in US-
based forces and the post+onflict "re-
constitution" expe,nses necessary to restore
the deployed forces to a satisfrctory
steady-state operational tempo'ar.
(ii) The United Kingdom
66. The British Minisry of Defe,nce noted five
important points:
(... ) From the international perspective,
the first lesson for the Alliance is the
value ofunity of purpose (...);
second, in cooperation with our Allies,
we need to CIemine ways in which
mernber states can increase their qual-
itative and quantitative military conti-
bution to NATO's overall capabilities.
The priority lies in such areas asi pre-
cision attack weapors, secure conmun-
ications and strategic moveme,lrt asssts.
Interoperability of systems will, of
course, be a key componexft of this;
- 
thir{ there is a particular need to boost
European capabilities. In order to
our ability to use force ef-
fectively, we Europeans need to im-
prove the readiness, deployability and
sustainability of our armed forces and
their ability to €ng4ge in both high ls-
tensity operations and those of an ex-
peditionary nature. This would sfiel€-
the,lr our contribution to NATO, which
rsmains the sole instrumeflf for collec-
tive defence. NATO will still be the
natural choice for the conduct of non-
Article 5 crisis-managernent operations
a tOd:Ofuu1essons learned", www.defenselinkmil
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which North American and European
Allies might choose to undertake in the
future. A strenghened European cap-
ability would allow us to undertake
European-led crisis-management oper-
ations, in circumstances in which the
whole Alliance is not engaged. We
strongly support the focus of the Euro-
pean defence debate on these key cap-
abilities and the more effective target-
ing of defence resources. We will pur-
sue these aims through NATO's De-
fence Capabilities Initiative, and the
Western European Union's audit of
European capability (. . . );
fourtll our experie,nces have vindicated
the analysis that underpinned the
Strategic Defence Review. While fuIl
implemeirtation of the Review's recom-
meirdations has not yet been completed,
the reguireme,nts on deployability, mo-
bility and sustainability have bee,n firm-
ly underlined;
the fifttr lesson reflects the importance
of efficient military and political con-
sultation and decision maklng machin-
ery in the Alliance. Throughout the
conflict, Allies kept in constant touch,
both in NATO and through bilateral
and multilateral contacts at Ministerial,
Head of Government and senior mili-
tary and diplomatic stafflevel (...)'*'.
67. This document tackles another important
issue: public relations and public opinion. The
docume,nt stat€s:
"The importance of public opinion cannot
be over<mphasised (...). It is clear tlut, in
democratic counties with a free press, this
fas-moving area is a characteristic of
modem conflict which is likely to be in-
creasingly demanding in the future."
68. Following the preliminary conclusions
drawn from this initial assessment, the British
defence authorities decided to focus on "the UK's
capability for air and sand-off attack of a range
of targets in varying weather conditions. Detailed
exardnation of what was achievd as well as
6" Ko.*o Crisis": A Paper by Lord Robertson
of Port Ellerr' UK Ministry of Defence,www.mod.uk
operational analysis of future options, will be
required. A range of issues in the very fast-mov-
ing communications and information systems
areas need continuing scrutiny to ensure ttrat we
can gather and pass information securely and
quickly at a number of levels. These range from
Headquarters to, perhaps, individual aircrafl
tanks and ships. We need to take forward work
already outlined in the Strategic Defence Review
on deploying and supporting our Services on
expeditionary operations'*3.
69. However, according to the British news-
paper The Sunday Telegraph$, in a reference to
the confidential army re,port dra.fted by Brigadier
Adrian Freeros, 'NATO troops' advance in Kos-
ovo had the poftntial to be hampered by serious
difficulties in communications and the chain of
comrnand". According to this report which was
cited in the newspaper, "ComKFOR's (General
Sir Michael Jackson's) intent was not always
transmiued with sufficient detail and coordin-
ating instnrctions. Eve,n when detail was re-
quested from KFOR it was not always forttr-
coming. This led to improvisation at brigade
level and a consequently asymmeric effect with-
in KFOR as differe,nt brigades made their own
interpretations. (...) The division of responsib-
ilities between national and NATO operational
chains of comrnand took some time to become
clear (...)". According ta The Sunday Telegraph,
"The rqrort supports rece,lm testimony to the Un-
ited States Congress by General Wesley Clarh
NATO's overall comrnander during the Kosovo
campaign. In July, General Clark told congress-
me,n that the Alliance was 'hamstrung by com-
peting political and military interests ttrat may
have prolonged the conflict". Finally, the article
quotes Roya1 Air Force officers and Air Vice Mar-
shal Jock Stimrp, the assistant chief of the air
safi, who gave the following issessment of the air
srikes: 'We dont Inow how many anks were
desroyed and we will have no way of knowing".
(iii) France
70. Dunng a seminar organised by the Fre,nch
Defence Ministry on 2l June 1999 on "Initial
%d"4 
"General Jackson criticised by Kosovo report",
The Sunday Telegraph, lT Oaober 1999.
o' Brig. Freer was in charge of the Parachute Regr-
ment and Gurkha soldiers who were the firsg apart
from special forces, to enter Kosovo on 12 June.
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lessons to be drawn from the operations m
Kosovo", the French authorities expressed the
view ttrat progress had beeir made in the fields of
"intelligence, daylight and night precision strikes
and the aptitude of personnel to participate in all
levels of the NATO chain of operational com-
mand". The last point is importanq giveir ttrat
France is not "integrated" in the military struc-
ture of the Atlantic Alliance. The document also
points out, however, that 'tlre balance is still
heavily tilted in favour of the United States. Al-
though Europe had a sufficient number of air-
craft, the imbalance reinforces the effects of the
United States'technological lead. This enables it
to play a predominant role, in particular in the
comrnand structures. Better coordination of the
comrnand of the European air forces would help
reduce the gap. In the future, concerted or even
joint planning of snrdies and defence equipment
will be necessary, in order to make the most of
European countries' strong points, optimise their
assets and reduce that gap".
7I. Various aspects of the command of opera-
tions in Kosovo were examined with a view to
improving procedures and preparing more effec-
tively for future operations. Key sectors were
defined for the purposes of the assessment in-
cluding comrnand structures, observation, elec-
tronic warfare, military sea- and airlift, in-flight
refuelling and civil-military operations. These
sectors are very importan! not only from an op-
erational but also a political sandpoinq for they
are arer$ in which the gap between Europe and
ttre United States is growing. During the session
devoted to the 'tapability gap" vis-i-vis the
United States, it was stressed that:
"This conflict highlighted the disparities
between the military assets of the United
States and those of Europe. The United
States has developed massive military ca-
pabilities consistent with the global anrbi-
tions it has entertained since the end of the
second world war. These disparities are
also due to the efforts made since the be-
ginning of the 1980s in the field of re-
search and armaments programmes. Our
technological lag in certain areas, such as
the real-time control of information and
stedth techniques, is due more to our
smaller research budgets (Europe's total
defence research budget is three times less
than that of the United States) than to a
problem of know-how on the part of Euro-
pean companies. Furthermore, the Kosovo
conflict highlighted both the quantitative
shortralls 
- 
which may affect our capacity
to sustain operations over a long period 
-
and a total lack of cerLain items of equip-
ment (cruise missiles, radar satellite ob-
servation systerns or ja:nming systems,
double identification of aircraft).
European courfiries, including NATO mem-
bers, probably do not have the means to
completely close the "capability gap" in
the immediate future. It is therefore appro-
priate to identiS those areas in which we
wish to offset existing disparities and
shortfalls an4 taking into account the bud-
getary constraints, to establish priorities. It
is important that such mqxures should be
taken in coordination with our European
parhers, with the aim of acquiring sfa-
tegic autonomy for Europe. At the end of
the day this approach should e,lrhance the
synergy between the defence budgets of
European countries and promote a streng-
theDmg of Europe's defencs industrial and
technological base."
M Conclusions
72. In a study of the Kosovo war published in
ttre magazine Foreign Policy6 (Brookings Insti-
tute), there is a quote by the fomrer Head of the
United States Joint Chiefs of Stafi General Colin
Powell, concenring the comrnand of military op-
erations:
4Decisive means and results are always to
be preferred, even if they are not always
possible. So you ba I get nervous whe,lr
so-called experts suggest that all we need
is a little surgical bombing or a limited
attack. When the desired result isn't ob-
tained, a new set of experts then comes
forward with talk of a little escalation.
History has not been kind to this ap-
proach."
73. NATO's military interve,ntion in Kosovo
cannot be reduced entirely to such an approacll
although from the conceptual and plaruring points
-uot*-irg 
the lessons of Kosovd', Ivo H Daalder
and Michael E. O'Ilanlon, in the autumn 1999 issue
of Foreign Policy, www.brook.edu
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of view it came close. It did" however, ope,n a
new chapter in intemational relations and mark a
new phase in their developme,nt. The crises of the
past five years in Europe, Africa and Asia have
shown the limitations of the regulatory system
built up around tle United Nations and various
regional organisations (OAS, OAU, OSCE). In
the absence of any means of intervention other
than those made available to those organisations
by their different member states, and in the ab-
sence of appropriate comnumd and conaol
strucLures, such crises have had to be resolved by
means of unilateral action, whiclq depending on
the power stnrcilres in that particular region, has
a disproportionate presenceo' in Kosovo, none at
all in Africa, a hesitant approach in Asia (ktd-
onesia and East Timor) and mufled reservations
with regard to Chechnya.
74. Respect for human rights, protection of
minorities, the right of selfdeterminatiorL respect
for electoral choices and the refusal to accept
border changes imposed by force: all these prin-
ciples are invoked to suit the circumstances and,
depending on whom one is dealing witL used as
political "weapons". This can only weaken their
impact and make any appeal to thenL particularly
by westem counties, suspect. The recent annual
session of the UN General Asserrbly revealed the
rifu dividing the advocates of "humanitarian
interfere,nce" from those who wish to abide by
the traditional principles that have governed in-
ternational relations since 1945, including that of
non-interference in other counfies' internal af-
fairs. The Kosovo crisis marked a turning-poing
after which people began to challenge ttrc present
international systern.
75. However, it is the peoples concerned who
must have the last word. The great majority of
Kosovar Albanians have opted for independence,
whoever is President of Yugoslavia. The Albani-
ans of the Balkan region have embarked on a
process of rediscovery of their linguistic, cultural
and historical ties which transcend the borders
fixed by those same states which have decided
a Some of tne European funds for the reconstnrction
of Kosovo were taken from EU aid for developing
countries. The budget ea:marked by the US Govern-
ment for setting up Camp Bondsteel to accommodate
the American troops in Kosovo is higher tlan
LINMIK's budget in real terms (source: Le Monde,
13 October 1999).
today, as they did at the beginning of the century,
to "play God" vis-i-vis those peoples, claiming
to bring enlightenment and civilisation. This
process can unfold gradualy and peacefully, or it
may spill over into viole,nce, insluding inta-
ethnic Albanian viole,nce. Aid for economic and
social development, indeed a guruine economic
commitnent to the reglon of south-eastem Eur-
ope, backed up by a cohere,nt political pro-
gr:unme founded on recognised legal principles
(the various Council of Europe conventions on
minority, human and social rights, for example),
together with credible prospects for integration in
the Euro-Atlantic structures, are all vital to se-
curity and stability. The financial costs are diffi-
cult to estimate, but they are certainly much less
than the costs paid in human lives for piut pro-
crastination and so-called humanitarian interve,n-
tion.
76. For Europe, in the limited sense of the
European Union, the Kosovo conflict showed
what can happen when words are not matched by
deeds. Two argumeirts were put forward to jus-
tifu the call for US military intervention. The
fust was the desire not to damage tansatlantic
relations and the second, the fact ttrat the consid-
erable military assets of the United States are a
deterrent to any potential aggressor. The leading
role played by the United States in NATO tends
to obscure the different feelings of European
countries about armed interventiorq and makes it
politically difficult to opt out unilaterally. As re-
gards armed forces and arrnamems, the initial Brit-
ish and French assessmexts of tlre Kosovo con-
flict have pointed clearly to the gap between
Europe and the United States and the risks of de-
couphng thatthis may entail forthe future.
77. It is wittr regard to the solutions that op-
inions diverge. For some European counties,
NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative is the ans-
wer, whereas for others the solution is to develop
autonomous procedures and capabilities outside
NATO in order to provide Europe with a
capacity 
- 
which above all must be credible 
- 
for
intervention. It is essentially a matter of political
will and of the relations between states. One's
perception of security in the Balkans and south-
eastern Europe will be very differe,nt if one is
looking at it from Lisbon or Athens, although it
is more important for Brussels than for Washing-
ton. NATO provides a framework which has the
advantage of being reassuring and above all" of
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not entailing major risks, given that as a last
resort the United States can cover practically all
contingencies. The sAkes would be higher in the
case of autonomous European intervelrtion and
the contibution ttrat each country would be
asked to make would be bigger 
- 
in the case of
Kosovo it would have meant an extra thousand
European aircraft and five to six thousand more
troops.
78. It is important in this debate to put mafiers
into perspective and to compare like with like. It
is not possible either in organisational or budget-
ary terms for European states, or for Europe at
the prese,lrt stage, to take the United States de-
fence system as a model. The technological race
may lead to a situation similar to the one that
developed between the United States and USSR
as a result ofthe Strategic Defense lnitiative. It is
sheer nonse,nse for Europe to imagine that it can
close the technological gap with the United
States. It would be too costly in both economic
and political terms, particularly since only a
small number of European counEies have the in-
dustrial, research and financial resources to make
headway in this area, and they are not prepared
to share the results with other countries which for
structural or economic reasons are not partici
pants in the various proguunmes that have beeir
organised. The Helios satellite does provide Eur-
ope with some intelligence capability, but only
the three nations particrpating in the programme
are entifled to decide which images can be passed
on to their allies€.
79. The Kosovo war has had a salutory effect
on the process of reflection about European de-
fe,nce. It highlightd Europe's shortcomings in
the fields of forces readiness, imeroperability (not-
withstanding more than 40 years of efforts within
NATO) and available equipment (in both quanti-
tative and qualitative terms). Havi4g established
that, it is important to come up with solutions
and to put them into practice. The Defence Cap-
abilities lnitiative, the WEU audit of forces, the
atempt to define convergexrce criteria for defe,lrce
spendi4g, industrial restnrctudng and the grow-
ing awareness of the need to step up scie,ntific
research at all levels (both civil and military) are
major steps in the right direction. Howwer, if
such efforts are to be crowned with success, ttrcy
must be preceded and accompanied by a graduat
harmonisation of national defeirce concepts and
policies. These are political decisions which have
to be taken at the highest level and will require
the support ofthe national parliaments.
rThe sa e rqrroach applies to the united States and
the intelligence transmiued by US satellites.
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